

**STATEMENT OF
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COMMAND;
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BEFORE THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
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I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to provide my statement to you. As the Commander, United Nations Command (UNC); Commander, United States (U.S.) – Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command (CFC); and Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK), it is a privilege to represent the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Department of Defense Civilians, and their families, who serve our great nation in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On behalf of these outstanding men and women, I want to thank the Committee for support it has provided to American forces stationed in the ROK and the ongoing commitment it has made to improve the quality of life for Command personnel and their families. Sustained support from Congress has allowed us to deter aggression against the ROK and promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, in turn, has promoted peace and stability in the broader region of Northeast Asia. I greatly appreciate this opportunity to report on the state of affairs in Korea. Specifically, this statement will address the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, priorities of the commands that I lead, recent developments at UNC, and how programs and initiatives currently being implemented will strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance and America's presence in Asia.

The Korean Peninsula sits at the heart of Northeast Asia – a dynamic region whose global influence is growing and has significant national interests for the U.S.¹ The growing influence of Northeast Asia can be seen in diplomatic, military, and economic terms. In diplomatic terms, the ROK successfully hosted the Seoul G-20 Summit last year, the first time a G-20 Summit was conducted outside the West and in an Asian nation. The ROK will also host the 2012 Nuclear

¹ The region of Northeast Asia is defined to include the following countries and special administrative regions: China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, North Korea, ROK, Russia, and Taiwan.

Security Summit. From a broader perspective, states in the region have assumed a more prominent role at a variety of international organizations and institutions. Northeast Asia is home to four of the world's six largest militaries when measured in terms of personnel as well as two nuclear powers (China and Russia).² The region contains 23% of the world's population and is an economic powerhouse.³ In 2010, Northeast Asia housed five of the world's 19 largest economies, where the region collectively accounted for 25.6% of global gross domestic product during that year.⁴ Countries in Northeast Asia accounted for 26.7% of U.S. trade in goods during 2010.⁵

While Northeast Asia's international influence is growing and it has become a major economic region, it is also a region characterized by uncertainty, fast-paced change, lingering historical animosities between states and peoples, territorial disputes, competition over access to resources, and in some cases struggles for regional hegemony. These characteristics have combined to pose difficult and long-term security challenges not only for states in the region but for the international community as well. The ongoing security challenges posed by events in Northeast Asia can be exemplified by North Korea's unprovoked attacks on the ROK naval ship Cheonan in March 2010 and on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 as well as Pyongyang's continued pursuit of nuclear programs. By maintaining U.S. military forces in the ROK, a stabilizing presence is maintained that allows for the implementation of strategies that promotes

² In terms of number of personnel in the armed forces, the world's six largest militaries during the year 2010 were: China (2.28 million personnel); U.S. (1.58 million); India (1.32 million); North Korea (1.1 million); Russia (1.02 million); and the ROK (633,000). Personnel data, except for that on the ROK, was obtained from *The Military Balance 2010*, produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

³ Population percentage calculated with data obtained from the *CIA World Fact Book*. Percentage is as of July 2010.

⁴ Country rankings based on gross domestic product measured at purchasing power parity and obtained from the *CIA World Fact Book*.

⁵ Trade percentage was calculated with data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.

peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, contributing toward the de-escalation of security crises when they do occur. U.S. military forces in Korea are a long-term investment in regional peace and stability. The role played by these forces in Northeast Asia are particularly important because, unlike the case in Europe with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union, there are no regional-based security institutions designed to prevent and resolve inter-state conflict.

U.S. force presence in Korea is also a vital part of maintaining security commitments to the ROK established under the Mutual Defense Treaty.⁶ An ongoing American military presence in the ROK helps set the conditions for the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner as well as peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. By having U.S. military forces forward-stationed in Korea, engagement is enhanced not only with this key alliance partner, but with other states and actors throughout Northeast Asia as well. A meaningful U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula is essential to meet treaty requirements with the ROK and to address security challenges posed by the dynamic, developing – but potentially unstable – region of Northeast Asia.

II. SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

ROK

The ROK was the victim of two unprovoked attacks by North Korea in the year 2010. The first attack occurred on 26 March and resulted in the sinking of a ROK naval ship (Cheonan) and the death of 46 sailors while the ship was patrolling off the west coast of Korea in the vicinity of Paengnyong Island. In the aftermath of the Cheonan tragedy, the ROK led a joint

⁶ The May 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy identifies the security of allies as an enduring American interest.

civilian-military investigation group to determine the cause of the Cheonan's sinking that included the participation of experts from foreign governments. The group concluded that the Cheonan was sunk due to a torpedo launched by a North Korean submarine. This conclusion was assessed by a special investigative team from the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), which determined that North Korea's action constituted serious violations of the Armistice Agreement.⁷ UNCMAC's determination was endorsed by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.⁸

The second unprovoked attack occurred on 23 November 2010 when North Korea unleashed an artillery barrage on the island of Yeonpyeong. Firing approximately 170 rounds in total with about 80 shells hitting the island, this attack was particularly brutal because it struck not only military facilities but civilian areas as well. Two South Korean Marines and two civilians were killed during the barrage while 16 Marines and 52 civilians were wounded. An investigation into the attack conducted by an UNCMAC special investigation team, which was composed of representatives from nine countries and whose work was observed by representatives from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, reached the following key findings:

- North Korea's attack was a hostile act and an act of armed force against the ROK;
- The attack was a deliberate and premeditated action; and

⁷ Members of the UNCMAC special investigation team came from the countries of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, ROK, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

⁸ Established by the Armistice Agreement, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) acts as a neutral and impartial body between all parties to observe and report on compliance with the Armistice Agreement. Observers from the NNSC came from Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland.

- North Korea's failure to enforce a complete cessation of hostilities in Korea, execution of an armed attack against areas legitimately under military control of the Commander United Nations Command, and execution of an attack that caused considerable damage to military facilities and the destruction of civilian homes and property, constituted serious violations of the Armistice Agreement.⁹

In response to these unprovoked attacks by North Korea, the U.S. and ROK engaged in a series of combined military exercises designed to send Pyongyang a clear message that its irresponsible and belligerent behavior must stop and that both countries remain committed to enhancing their combined defense capabilities. The first exercise held in this series, a combined maritime and air readiness event held from 25-28 July 2010, was called *Invincible Spirit* and occurred in the seas east of the Korean Peninsula. The exercise conducted extensive training in the areas of anti-submarine warfare, battle group air defense, surface warfare training to include live fire exercises, and included a robust component of aircraft that flew a variety of missions in the skies over and around the ROK.

Invincible Spirit was followed by the *Ulchi Freedom Guardian* exercise held from 16-26 August 2010. This annual exercise, like all other training events conducted by the CFC, was designed to improve the U.S.-ROK Alliance's ability to defend the ROK. The exercise was focused on ensuring readiness to prepare for, prevent, and prevail against a full range of provocations that could occur on the Korean Peninsula both now and in the future. It helped

⁹ Members of the UNCMAC special investigation team came from the countries of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States. Observers from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission came from Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland.

teach, coach, and mentor Command personnel on staff and leadership decision-making processes.

Following *Ulchi Freedom Guardian* was a U.S.-ROK anti-submarine warfare exercise conducted from 27 September to 1 October 2010. Focused on practicing anti-submarine warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures, the exercise occurred in the waters west of the Korean Peninsula. This anti-submarine warfare exercise was followed by a U.S.-ROK naval and air training event from 28 November to 1 December 2010. Held in waters west of the Korean Peninsula, the exercise provided training in the areas of fleet protection, alerts/intercepts and defensive counter air/combat air patrols, air defense, surface warfare readiness, basic seamanship maneuvers, logistics sustainment, and communications. When viewed in their totality, the set of combined exercises conducted since North Korea's unprovoked attack on the Cheonan have been designed to demonstrate U.S. and ROK resolve to enhance their defense capabilities and readiness, improve force interoperability, and show U.S. commitment to regional security. It should be noted that our Korean partners and friends greatly appreciated the resolutions passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate expressing condolences to those killed and their families following North Korea's attacks on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island.¹⁰

NORTH KOREA

North Korea continues to threaten both regional and global peace and security. Over the past year, Pyongyang continued its two-pronged strategy of provocation and charm to achieve

¹⁰ In addition to the exercises discussed above, USFK sent a 19-person liaison officer team to observe the 20 December 2010 ROK live fire exercise at Yeonpyeong Island. The task of the liaison team was to advise and assist. The UNC/UNCMAC also sent an observation team to the 20 December live fire exercise to ensure that the event was defensive in nature and did not violate terms in the Armistice Agreement. The UNC/UNCMAC team was composed of members from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, United Kingdom, and the United States.

regime objectives with the ROK, the U.S., and the international community. This strategy included the Cheonan sinking, the attempted assassination of a high-profile defector, and the artillery attack against Yeonpyeong Island. Simultaneously, North Korea continued to develop its nuclear and long-range missile delivery capabilities, initiated construction of a light water reactor, and revealed the existence of a uranium enrichment program at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center. Pyongyang continues its “military first” policy and maintains a massive, forward-deployed conventional force. Plans for succession of Kim Jong-il’s third son appear to be accelerating. Absent a commitment to institute fundamental, systematic reform – which appears unlikely in the near term – North Korea will remain a serious security threat in the region and a significant concern for the U.S. and the international community.

Strategy, Goals, and Internal Dynamics

Kim Jong-il’s ultimate strategic goal is the survival of his regime. To achieve this end, the Kim Regime must maintain control over the population and prevent external powers from threatening its interests. As part of its “self-reliance” philosophy, Pyongyang’s foreign policy attempts to divide regional alliances and minimize external influence over its affairs. North Korea balances a reliance on Chinese support and patronage with a desire for maintaining independence. Concurrently, North Korea engages the U.S. with the likely goal of garnering financial, food, and energy assistance, as well as security guarantees. Internally, the regime maintains the facade of a significant external threat, primarily from the U.S., to maintain control and justify sacrifices associated with its “military first” policy.

A key component of this multi-dimensional strategy is North Korea's nuclear program. This program serves as a diplomatic tool, a means to capture international attention, a deterrent against regional interference, a point of domestic prestige, and a potential source of hard currency. This was exemplified by last year's light water reactor and uranium enrichment program announcements and public proclamations regarding plutonium reprocessing and weaponization. These efforts, along with development of a complementary missile delivery system, are paramount to regime survival. North Korea, which is assessed to have enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons, ultimately seeks international recognition as a de facto nuclear weapons state.

Another key element of North Korean strategy is to maintain a large conventional military force. Although aging and technologically inferior, North Korea's massive army and vast artillery forces continue to threaten the ROK. North Korea continues to focus on its asymmetric capabilities by sustaining and improving special operating forces and their insertion methods. Whether directed toward regional neighbors and U.S. sovereign territory, or as an export item, Pyongyang's missile capabilities remain a regional and global threat. Like its nuclear program, North Korea views its theater ballistic missile program as a source of international power and prestige, a strategic deterrent focused on the U.S., a means of exerting regional influence, and a source of hard currency. For these reasons, despite chronic and severe fiscal difficulties, North Korea continues to spend millions of dollars annually to develop and produce ballistic missiles, although missile sales have been hampered due to enhanced international sanctions. North Korea's inventory of ballistic missiles currently exceeds 800 airframes, which are capable of ranging targets from the ROK and Japan to Guam and the

Aleutian Islands. The regime continues to invest in research and development of an intercontinental ballistic missile capability that could threaten the continental U.S.

Domestically, Kim Jong-il remains in control despite reports of lingering health issues. Over the past year, there are indications that he has focused on setting the stage for his third and youngest son, Kim Jong-un, as his successor. In September 2010, Kim Jong-un was publically promoted to 4-star general in the North Korean People's Army and appointed as Vice Chairman of the Korean Workers Party Central Military Commission. Since then, the younger Kim has made several civil, military, and economic public appearances with his father. North Korea's ruling elite, whose position depends upon the status quo, appears unwavering in its loyalty to the Kim Regime and will likely support the succession process.

For most North Koreans outside major cities, life remains focused on survival in a poverty-stricken state. North Korea's annual domestic food production remains insufficient, with the country dependent upon Chinese and outside assistance to meet basic subsistence requirements. Despite this shortfall, Pyongyang continues to divert precious national resources from the civil sector to conventional and asymmetric military forces in support of the regime's military first policy.

Provocations and Posturing

The past year served as another unfortunate example of North Korea's strategy of alternating provocation with gestures of reconciliation. Early in the year, Pyongyang signaled renewed interest in reaching a peace agreement and returning to Six-Party Talks. During

ensuing dialogue, the North sought to restart Kumgang Mountain and Kaesong City tours; however, subsequent bilateral working-level talks made little progress.

When these negotiations failed, the North shifted to belligerence. In March, North Korea threatened to attack ROK and U.S. forces participating in the annual Key Resolve exercise, closely followed by the sinking of the ROK ship Cheonan on 26 March. Following this attack, Pyongyang announced plans to build a light water reactor on 30 March. While North Korea claims this reactor is for power production, experts believe the North's true motive is to produce highly enriched uranium for its nuclear weapons program.

April witnessed yet another spate of provocative acts. On the 21st, ROK authorities detained three North Korean assassins on a mission to assassinate North Korea's most senior defector, Hwang Jang-yop. Then, on 23 April, North Korea announced it would seize and freeze ROK government and private assets at the Kumgang Mountain resort.

Over the summer, North Korea's multiple attempts at dialogue failed due to the Kim Regime's refusal to acknowledge the Cheonan attack. The North turned to provocation once again, with threats made against U.S.-ROK military exercises, ROK loudspeakers along the Demilitarized Zone, and vessels and aircraft operating in waters and airspace along the Northern Limit Line. These threats were followed by a Korean Workers' Party meeting in October and official installment of Kim Jong-un to key high-level positions of leadership for future succession. There was a brief pause in tensions for family reunions at the Kumgang Mountain Resort from late October to early November; however, North Korea tried unsuccessfully to tie these reunions to increased aid and assistance to which the ROK government would not agree.

The provocation cycle continued in November with the North Korean announcement of a uranium enrichment program and the attack on Yeongpyeong Island.

Since the Yeongpyeong Island attack, North Korea has resumed its “charm campaign” in an attempt to obtain economic aid. Pyongyang has proposed Red Cross talks, engagement with major ROK political parties, military-to-military talks, and an appeal to many countries and non-governmental organizations for food aid. Inter-Korean military talks have not progressed beyond the colonel level as the North Korean People’s Army delegation walked out of negotiations.

North Korean Threat Outlook

I have two main concerns regarding the future of North Korea. My first concern is the potential for instability. The country’s disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector, insufficient agricultural base, and malnourished populace could lead to a destabilizing situation that could unfold rapidly and unpredictably. My second concern is Pyongyang’s focus on developing its nuclear and missile capabilities. If left unchecked, North Korea will likely develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capability, which could threaten the U.S. and its allies. North Korea’s proliferation record exacerbates the threat that these programs pose to the international community.

Pyongyang will likely continue its attempts to entice and/or coerce the community of nations into providing aid and concessions. North Korea will also likely continue a strategy of heightening tensions to capture the world spotlight, re-establish its negotiating baseline, and gauge regional resolve. We must never be complacent about the danger that Pyongyang might

make a major miscalculation and launch an attack on the ROK. To address this threat, UNC/CFC/USFK maintains a high level of readiness through the rigorous pursuit of three command priorities, as discussed in Section III below.

III. COMMAND PRIORITIES

The Command mission is to deter North Korean provocations and aggression and – if deterrence fails – to fight and win. This mission is accomplished through the employment of forward-stationed, agile, and well-trained forces that are located on the Korean Peninsula and operate together with our ROK ally. My Command vision is to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined combined and joint commands that are ready to fight and win. These commands lead, integrate, and direct all available forces during times of Armistice, crisis, and war.

In support of this mission and vision are three Command priorities. These priorities have remained constant over time and serve as the guiding principles for all key initiatives pursued. The three priorities are: 1) be prepared to fight and win; 2) strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance; and 3) improve the quality of life for service members, Department of Defense (DoD) civilians, and their families. As Command initiatives are developed and implemented, they are executed in accordance with and in support of these three priorities. I will next address each of these priorities in order and discuss some key initiatives that are being pursued within them.

PREPARED TO FIGHT AND WIN

My first priority as Commander of UNC, CFC, and USFK is to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined combined and joint commands that are prepared to fight and win. This has been the focus of U.S. forces stationed in Korea for more than 50 years and for the CFC since it was

established in 1978. Maintaining “fight tonight” readiness is a key reason U.S. forces are stationed in the ROK, supporting the alliance between the American and Korean people in defense of the ROK. The Alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge with little warning on the Korean Peninsula. This spectrum of conflict ranges from major combat operations under conditions of general war or provocation, to multiple possibilities of destabilizing conditions on the Peninsula, to humanitarian assistance operations, and even the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Given these varied potential security challenges, it is imperative that our forces maintain the highest possible level of training and readiness.

In order to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge on the Korean Peninsula, the Command has developed and constantly refines plans to deter provocations and aggression against the ROK, defeat aggression should deterrence fail, and respond to other destabilizing conditions that could affect the Korean Peninsula. Successful execution of these plans requires a well trained force that can execute tasks across the spectrum. Thus, warfighting skills are developed and maintained through the conduct of tough, realistic, combined, and interagency exercises.

In the past, the CFC and ROK military have almost exclusively focused training on defense against an all-out high intensity attack by North Korea. However, as the CFC has broadened the scope of its planning, it is also doing the same with respect to training and exercises. The CFC and ROK military now exercise one North Korean attack scenario and one limited attack/provocation/instability scenario per year. The CFC has also added considerable weapons of mass destruction elimination training into its exercise scenarios to fortify plans in

support of combined policy objectives. In addition, the CFC is increasing counter-provocation training with the ROK military, both in the regularly scheduled major theater exercises and in other training events throughout the year as well.

Three annual joint and combined exercises warrant special mention: Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and Foal Eagle. Ulchi Freedom Guardian and Key Resolve are computer-simulated theater command post exercises conducted by CFC that focuses on ensuring “fight tonight” readiness to prepare for, prevent, and prevail against the full range of current and future provocations, attacks, and instability on the Korean Peninsula. In the future the Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise will be used to support transition from a CFC-led command and control warfighting structure to one where the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) becomes the supported headquarters. Foal Eagle consists of a series of joint and combined unit level field training events that exercise ground maneuver, air, naval, expeditionary, and special operations capabilities. These events are conducted throughout the Korean Peninsula. Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and Foal Eagle are supplemented throughout the year by a host of other challenging training activities that are designed to sustain Command readiness.

The ROK military’s capabilities and posture is a key component of our fight and win preparedness. Numbering over 633,000 active duty personnel, it is a modern, mobile network centric warfare capable force that fields an array of advanced weapon systems. The ROK military is led by a professional officer corps and the force as a whole has gained operational experience through deployments to places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, Lebanon, and participation in a host of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance

This battle tested force and its leaders understand the requirements for military readiness in addition to accomplishing tasks under adverse conditions.

Real world operational experience is continually supplemented by the conduct of a realistic and tough exercise program. In addition to participation in the Ulchi Freedom Guardian/Key Resolve/Foal Eagle exercises discussed above, other key training events include the annual Taegueuk, Hoguk, and Hwarang exercises as well as a series of events that have been conducted in response to North Korea's recent attacks.¹¹ The ROK military's capabilities will only get better over time as it refines and implements its defense reform initiative. Designed to address the future security environment, it will develop an information and technology-intensive military force that can better address a comprehensive set of security threats to include North Korea's asymmetric capabilities and enhanced participation in operations sponsored by the international community.

STRENGTHEN THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE

My second priority is to strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance. As stated in the May 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy, American alliances with key regional partners to include the ROK are the bedrock of security in Asia and a foundation for prosperity in the Asia-Pacific area.¹² This priority supports the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision statement that commits both

¹¹ Taegueuk is a command post exercise that reinforces operational capabilities of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and derives requirements for joint forces and unit structure development. Hoguk focuses on improving interoperability between the military branches and is a live-maneuver joint event. Finally, Hwarang is an integrated defense headquarters-led rear area training exercise that includes civilian, government, and military elements as participants.

¹² The document also notes that American national security depends on vibrant alliances and that these alliances are force multipliers (the effects of cooperation and coordination are greater than if states act alone). Secretary of State Clinton added during a 28 October 2010 speech on American engagement in the Asia-Pacific that U.S. bonds with regional allies to include the ROK remains the foundation for American strategic engagement in the region, describing the U.S.-ROK Alliance as a lynchpin of stability and security in the Asia-Pacific and beyond.

nations to build an Alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world as a whole. A key feature of Alliance evolution is the transition of wartime operational control.

At the request of ROK President Lee Myung-bak President Obama agreed at the G20 Summit in June 2010 to adjust timing of the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from CFC to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The transition will now occur in December 2015. Under OPCON transition, the U.S. and ROK will disestablish CFC and stand up separate but complementary national commands consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty to focus on combined defense of the ROK. Once OPCON transition is completed, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) will become the supported – or lead – command and the newly created U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be the supporting command. The ROK JCS will retain full control of ROK military forces while the KORCOM commander will have control over U.S. forces.

Although the U.S. and ROK were on track militarily for OPCON transition in 2012, the adjusted timeframe will provide the Alliance additional time to synchronize a variety of ongoing transformation initiatives of which OPCON transition is just one. As stated last June by President Obama during a joint press conference with ROK President Lee Myung-bak, the revised December 2015 transition date provides appropriate time to – within the existing security context – better manage OPCON transition because the U.S.-ROK Alliance is the lynchpin of security not only for the two countries but for the Pacific region as a whole. During this extended period of time the ROK will strengthen and reinforce its intelligence, operations planning and execution, and joint battlefield management capabilities. Indeed, the ROK is already in the process of procuring the equipment, conducting the training, and making the

organizational changes needed to lead the warfight. Until all these actions are completed, however, the U.S. will provide agreed upon bridging and enduring capabilities. By adjusting the date of OPCON transition to late 2015 the ROK has more time to field many of the critical systems that are part of its ongoing defense reform initiative.

At the U.S.-ROK Foreign and Defense Minister's Meeting in July 2010 agreement was reached to develop a comprehensive Alliance transformation plan that includes and goes beyond merely OPCON transition. Called Strategic Alliance 2015, the plan was affirmed and signed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and then ROK Defense Minister Kim Tae-young at the 42nd Security Consultative Meeting in October 2010. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan will synchronize multiple U.S. and ROK transformation efforts that are designed to build adaptive and flexible capabilities to deter aggression against the ROK and to defeat aggression should it occur. Key elements of the comprehensive plan include: refining and improving combined defense plans; defining and developing the new organizational structures required for ROK lead of the war effort; implementing more realistic exercises based on the North Korean threat of today and tomorrow; preparing for the transition of wartime OPCON to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 2015; and consolidating U.S. military forces in the ROK onto two enduring hubs under the Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan.¹³

The goal of all initiatives under the Strategic Alliance 2015 construct is to build adaptive force capabilities that deter and defeat future provocations against the ROK and fight and win on the Korean Peninsula should deterrence fail. While Alliance evolution will occur under Strategic

¹³ Annexes contained in the plan include: plans; organizations; capabilities and systems; exercises; force management and tour normalization; U.S. force relocation; strategic documents; strategic communications; milestones; and governance.

Alliance 2015, one thing that will not change and remain constant is U.S. commitment to ROK security and the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan as a whole synchronizes ongoing transformation efforts to ensure they are aligned and mutually supporting. It reaffirms U.S. commitment to ROK and regional security and better postures both nations to deter, counter, and defeat North Korean provocations and aggression. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan moves the U.S. and ROK toward building an Alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world, as called for in the June 2009 Presidential Joint Vision for the U.S.-ROK Alliance.

The military aspect of Alliance development will continue through the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation that were agreed to by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of Defense in October 2010. Established to direct the future course of the U.S.-ROK defense relationship, they are based on and serve to advance the June 2009 Joint Vision Statement and the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The guidelines are rooted in a bilateral commitment to provide mutual security and to build a comprehensive strategic Alliance of bilateral, regional, and global scope, founded on common values and mutual trust. Under the guidelines the U.S. upholds a firm commitment to ROK defense by maintaining an American military presence on the Korean Peninsula that works with ROK forces to deter North Korean aggression. American commitment is demonstrated by an enduring force presence, the tour normalization initiative (discussed later), provision of bridging and enduring capabilities, the

supply of augmentation forces in contingencies, and the continued provision of extended deterrence.¹⁴

In order to meet the broad strategic vision of the Alliance, the defense guidelines specify that the U.S. and ROK will implement a set of enabling measures needed for an effective combined defense posture. These enabling measures are: to enhance intelligence and information sharing; strengthen operational planning; further develop capabilities to address the ballistic missile threat from North Korea; institutionalize an extended deterrence policy committee; enhance interoperability; enhance the combined exercise program; and to collaborate on lessons learned. The defense guidelines also recognize the importance of close bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global peace and stability. With this recognition in mind, the guidelines list measures that will be taken to strengthen the Alliance's role in enhancing regional and global security. These measures are: strengthening capabilities to contribute to regional and global peace and stability; supporting the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials, technologies, and their means of delivery; enhancing bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral defense relationships; strengthening cooperation for international security and peacekeeping efforts; and cooperating closely on other transnational and non-traditional security challenges.¹⁵ The defense guidelines recognize the importance of close

¹⁴ As stated in the Defense Guidelines, the U.S. remains committed to providing extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of its military capabilities to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities.

¹⁵ It should be noted that the ROK is already participating in about eight international peacekeeping operations and supporting disaster relief and recovery operations in Haiti, anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, and operates a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan. The ROK established a 1,000 person International Peace Support Force military unit in 2010 that is capable of deploying to international peacekeeping operations within one-month of being ordered to do so. The ROK has also become an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). After endorsing the PSI principles in May 2009, the ROK organized the Eastern Endeavor PSI maritime interdiction exercise in October 2010, hosted the PSI Asia-Pacific Regional Workshop from 28-29 October 2010,

policy and strategic consultation between the U.S. and ROK for the enhancement of common interests and further development of the Alliance.

The ROK continues to provide financial and in-kind support to help offset the cost of stationing U.S. military forces on its territory. Known formally as burden sharing contributions, the annual value of these contributions is dictated by terms established in a five-year (2009-2013) Special Measures Agreement currently in effect. During calendar year 2011 the ROK will provide USFK with 812.5 billion won (\$743 million) of burden sharing support.¹⁶ This support will be distributed between three categories: labor (338.6 billion won; pays salaries and benefits of USFK's Korean national employees); logistics (140.6 billion won; covers logistic equipment, supplies, and services); and ROK Funded Construction (333.3 billion won; used for USFK's military construction and military construction-like requirements). Burden sharing contributions helps ensure that the Command maintains its fight tonight readiness and builds the infrastructure needed for a transformed and long-term U.S. military force presence in the ROK. Burden sharing expenditures also stimulate the ROK economy through the payment of wages to Korean national employees, Korean service contracts, and Korean construction contracts, serving as a source of economic growth for communities that host USFK facilities. Future increases in the ROK burden sharing contribution through the year 2013 are tied to changes in the ROK consumer price index.

and joined the PSI's Operational Experts Group in November 2010. ROK President Lee Myung-bak stated during a Korean War anniversary speech on 28 September 2010 that Korean armed forces must "become one that contributes to the betterment of mankind, to global peace and stability, and prosperity."

¹⁶ U.S. dollar figure calculated by using a forecasted average 2011 Korean Won/\$U.S. exchange rate of 1,094. This forecasted exchange rate was obtained from the December 2010 monthly economic report published by the Korea Development Institute.

The Command's *Good Neighbor Program* continues to make great progress in strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance. The purpose of the program is to conduct community outreach events that engage and connect the Command with the local Korean community, government, media, business, and educational institutions in order to create understanding and appreciation for the mission of USFK. Good Neighbor Program events educate, inform, and familiarize Koreans with the role USFK plays on the Korean Peninsula. This direct engagement allows Americans and Koreans to develop mutual understanding of one another's cultures, customs, and lifestyles, often leading to the formation of lifelong friendships between members of the two communities.

Examples of events conducted by the Good Neighbor Program include English-language camps, speaking engagements by U.S. military personnel, and security education programs which include tours of the Joint Security Area/Demilitarized Zone and USFK installations. The program promotes two-way exchange between USFK personnel and people of our host country. It also helps foster exchange, understanding, and cooperation between members of USFK and the Korean communities that exist alongside USFK facilities. Some 2,595 events were conducted during the year 2010 with the participation of 146,543 local nationals. It is also noteworthy that the ROK Ministry of National Defense operates a similar program called *Friends Forever*. Having a purpose of strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance and nurturing friendships between Americans and Koreans, the program gives USFK personnel the opportunity to experience Korean culture by participating in various host-nation sponsored events and tours. Both the Good Neighbor Program and Friends Forever strengthen the Alliance at the professional and personal levels. While it is hard to empirically identify effects of the Good

Neighbor Program, opinion surveys done by the Department of State show that since the program was established in 2003, the percentage of Koreans that have a favorable opinion of the U.S. has increased from 47% to 74%. Additionally, the percentage of Koreans that believe USFK is important grew from 75% to 87%.

Finally, although not under the purview of USFK, the U.S. maintains a robust Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and a Defense Armaments Cooperation Program with the ROK that helps strengthen the Alliance. These programs promote interoperability between U.S. and ROK forces and thus create a more capable combined force. As of March 2011, the ROK has 587 active FMS cases that were valued in total at \$13.5 billion. During Fiscal Year 2010 the ROK purchased \$966.9 million in FMS, making it the 11th largest FMS buyer in that year. The ROK registered \$7.1 billion in FMS agreements over the 2002-2010 time period. FMS sales were augmented by a robust military training program. In 2009, the ROK paid to send 648 students to the U.S. for training in a variety of courses. Total expenditures by the ROK for FMS training were valued at \$60.7 million during the 2002-2009 timeframe.

IMPROVE QUALITY OF LIFE

Improving the quality of life for service members, DoD civilians, and their families is my third priority. My overall objective is to establish the infrastructure and operational climate that makes Korea the assignment of choice for DoD personnel. In order to achieve this objective and support this priority, the Command is currently implementing two key initiatives: the repositioning of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and tour normalization.

Repositioning of U.S. Forces in the ROK

The U.S. and ROK governments have agreed to consolidate and relocate American forces stationed in South Korea onto two enduring hubs south of the capital city Seoul. The relocation decision was prompted by two key factors. First, prior to the year 2005, the Command had 107 installations of various sizes in locations more or less where they had been when the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement went into effect. Second, the headquarters installation of U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Yongsan is located in the center of Seoul, a city of some 10 million people that is highly congested. Over the years this basing arrangement created a host of problems for USFK. These problems included civilian encroachment, declining quality of life for Command personnel due to aging and deteriorating facilities, and base locations that were no longer optimally located for the conduct of military operations today. All of these problems made it harder for the Command to train and maintain readiness.

The U.S.-ROK Alliance addressed these problems by developing two separate relocation plans for USFK. The first plan, called the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP), will move most forces currently stationed in and around Seoul and Headquarters United Nations Command activities to USAG Humphreys (about 40 miles south of Seoul). The majority of costs associated with this relocation plan will be paid by the ROK. Under the YRP, however, a residual Command element remains in Seoul to facilitate communications and maintain relationships with the ROK government and other organizations and actors in the capital area. The second relocation plan, named the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), consolidates U.S. forces in locations north of Seoul to areas south of this capital city and expands infrastructure at Osan Air Base and

Camp Mujuk as well. Costs associated with the LPP will be shared between the ROK and U.S. Provisions in the LPP help ensure continued readiness by providing U.S. forces dedicated time on ROK training areas and ranges.

Forces being repositioned under the YRP and LPP will be moved onto two enduring hubs south of Seoul: a southwest hub and a southeast hub. The southwest hub is centered on Osan Air Base and USAG Humphreys. It will be the future centerpiece of U.S. military force structure in Korea. This hub is already home to the headquarters of 7th Air Force and over time, as the repositioning plans are executed, will also house the future KORCOM, 8th Army Headquarters, and 2nd Infantry Division. The southeast hub will include USFK installations located in the cities of Daegu, Chinhae, and Busan. This hub will serve as the logistics distribution center and storage location for wartime and contingency prepositioned stocks. When completed, the two enduring hubs will be world-class installations that create a host of operational efficiencies and quality of life improvements for Command personnel. The hubs also increase force protection and survivability by moving a majority of personnel and equipment outside the tactical effective range of North Korean artillery.

The repositioning of U.S. forces in Korea will occur in two distinct phases: consolidation and relocation. Phase I – consolidation – is currently underway. The Command has returned 36 installations to the ROK so far, in the process giving over 12,000 acres of land back to the Korean people. In turn, the ROK has acquired about 2,300 acres of land around USAG Humphreys in order to support development and expansion of that hub. The ROK has so far granted 1,017 acres of this acquired land to the U.S. for garrison development. This initial land

grant allows the U.S.-ROK Alliance to begin planning, designing, and coordinating for the necessary construction. The remaining 1,300 acres of land will be granted as needed to support repositioning under the YRP and LPP. At the end of 2010, there were 24 projects under construction at USAG Humphreys, which had a combined value of \$1.3 billion. Facilities under construction included barracks, vehicle maintenance, family housing, an airfield hanger and operation building, fire stations, and upgrades to utility infrastructure. An additional \$3.5 billion worth of facilities and infrastructure were under planning and design. Phase I consolidation should not be viewed in any way as a lessening in U.S. commitment to ROK security – the current U.S. troop level in Korea (28,500) will be maintained, as affirmed in the October 2010 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué.

Phase II of repositioning will involve the movement of forces onto one of the two enduring hubs discussed above. Once this phase is completed, U.S. forces will utilize 48 separate sites (many of which are training ranges and ammunition depots), well below the 107 facilities maintained prior to the year 2005. Movement under the repositioning initiative will not reduce the Command's "fight tonight" readiness. Moves in the relocation plan will be packaged and executed in manageable components that will allow units to maintain their full spectrum of operational and support capabilities. Completion of the repositioning initiative will be of great benefit for the U.S.-ROK Alliance because it improves readiness and soldier quality of life, realizes stationing efficiencies, signals continued American regional commitment, improves the combined capability to deter and defend against aggression directed at the ROK, improves command and control, optimizes use of land in Korea, and enhances force protection and survivability.

Tour Normalization

The U.S. DoD approved an increase in the tour lengths for service members permanently assigned to the ROK in December 2008. As noted in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD's long-term goal is to phase out all unaccompanied tours in Korea and change the status of U.S. forces in the ROK from being one of forward-deployed to one of being forward-stationed with family members. The decision to "normalize" tours in Korea was supplemented in October 2010 when the Secretary of Defense directed that USFK and the Services proceed with full tour normalization as affordable but not according to any specific timeline. Once completed, tour normalization will create an environment where most USFK service members are either on a three-year accompanied (with family members, also known as command sponsored) or a two-year unaccompanied tour (including those without dependents), a significant change from the current operational environment where the majority of Command military personnel serve on one-year unaccompanied assignments. This policy change better aligns USFK tour rotations with those practiced at other forward-stationed locations such as Europe and Japan.¹⁷

Initial implementation of the tour normalization initiative is currently under way. Since the year 2008, the number of families in Korea has increased from 1,600 to over 4,000 at the end of 2010, with an expectation that this figure will grow to 4,636 by the end of Fiscal Year 2011. Once tour normalization is completed all military personnel with dependents (about 14,000) assigned to the ROK will be able to be accompanied by their families. In order to effectively and fairly manage the distribution of command sponsored positions amongst Command personnel, a

¹⁷ It should be noted that in August 2009 the standard length of tour for USFK civilian personnel was also normalized. Civilians now serve an initial tour of 3-years in length, as opposed to the two-year tour that previously existed.

three-category position-based prioritized allocation system was established in November 2010, where the difference between categories is based upon factors such as the importance of a given position to mission accomplishment and continuity. The position-based allocation system improves force readiness by giving priority to those occupying key leadership billets or performing jobs that require critical and special skills and training. Expansion in the number of command sponsored families in Korea is directly tied to growth in the necessary infrastructure to support these families. Necessary infrastructure includes housing, medical facilities, and – in particular – schools.

Tour normalization provides a host of benefits. First and foremost, it improves force readiness and combat capability by keeping trained military personnel in place for longer periods of time, decreasing the annual turnover of Command personnel and thus lowering turbulence in the organizational environment and permanent change of station costs. About 85% of USFK service members currently rotate each year. By normalizing tours, force stability and continuity will be improved, allowing for the retention of trained and ready personnel and reducing the stress placed on troops, units, and military families that emanates from frequent rotations. Normalized tours promote the operation of sustainable personnel rotation rates that protect the force's long-term health and provide military families with greater clarity and predictability regarding service member deployments as called for in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. It will create a training and stationing environment in Korea similar to that faced by units located in Europe and Japan. In the process, the interoperability of U.S. and ROK forces will be improved and the cultural awareness of American military personnel serving in South Korea will be enhanced, thus strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance.

Tour normalization also improves the quality of life for Command personnel. By eliminating needless family separations (currently about 10,000 per year) and providing service members with facilities that meet modern DoD standards, readiness and troop morale will be improved. The initiative also signals a long-term U.S. commitment not only to security of the ROK – a key Alliance partner – but to the broader region of Northeast Asia as well. Although it will take time to build the appropriate infrastructure needed to support a larger number of family members in the ROK, the Command is dedicated to making full tour normalization a reality in South Korea. Now is the right time to effectuate tour normalization because of the ability to leverage off other Command transformation initiatives underway such as infrastructure being constructed under the YRP and LPP programs.

Although defense of the ROK is our number one priority and will never be compromised, given the lengthened time of tours under tour normalization, U.S. forces stationed in the ROK will become available to support regional exercises and global operations. Prior to tour normalization, providing this type of support was limited due to dwell time requirements and considerations related to repeated unaccompanied deployments. This aspect of tour normalization supports the Army Force Generation Model, reduces uncertainty for service members and their families, enables a more adaptive and flexible U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula, and provides a defense capability with long-term capacity for regional and global defense and security cooperation.¹⁸ It needs to be emphasized, however, that a more regionally and globally flexible U.S. force in South Korea will in no way jeopardize or lessen

¹⁸ This year 7th Air Force and 8th U.S. Army forces will participate in the exercises COBRA GOLD (Thailand) and BALIKITAN (Philippines). This is the first time that forces from 8th U.S. Army will participate in these two annual exercises.

U.S. commitment to defend the ROK. In its totality, our normalization will enhance force readiness, provide greater stability for military personnel and their families, improve quality of life, and demonstrate in no uncertain terms U.S. commitment to an enduring force presence in the ROK.

IV. UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

The United Nations Command (UNC) continues to exercise its responsibilities for implementing and enforcing compliance with the Armistice Agreement. In this regard, the UNC component of the Military Armistice Commission conducted two key special investigations over the last year, one related to the March 2010 sinking of the ROK naval ship Cheonan and the other related to North Korea's artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010. As discussed earlier, in both cases the UNC Military Armistice Commission found that North Korea's unprovoked attacks constituted serious violations of the Armistice Agreement. The Commission's investigative work showed that until the Armistice Agreement is superseded by a peace agreement, the UNC will continue to faithfully execute its Armistice Agreement implementation mission and endeavor to resolve through negotiations violations of the Armistice Agreement.

The number of countries actively participating in UNC expanded during the year 2010. On 23 November of that year, the Republic of South Africa officially rejoined UNC, becoming the command's 16th active participating nation.¹⁹ The Republic of South Africa fought in defense of the ROK during the Korean War and its decision to become an active participant in

¹⁹ The 16 UNC member countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

UNC once again was most welcomed by the Command. Joining a ready-made coalition of now 16 countries, South Africa stands firm with the other UNC nations to defend the ROK from aggression. The nations of UNC symbolize an international commitment to deter aggression against the ROK and the respect held for this nation as a key member of the international community.

The UNC continues to maintain a rear headquarters in Japan. Unique to that presence is a status of forces agreement that allows the UNC Commander to use seven UNC-flagged bases in Japan for the transit of UNC aircraft, vessels, equipment, and forces upon notification to the government of Japan. During 2010, four naval vessels and four aircraft called on ports in Japan under the auspices of the UNC. Almost 1,000 military personnel participated in these visits. The multi-national nature of the UNC rear headquarters is reflected in its leadership. Last year for the first time, a senior officer from Australia assumed command of the headquarters, while the deputy is an officer from Turkey.

V. SUMMARY

The Korean Peninsula sits at the heart of Northeast Asia, a dynamic region whose global influence is growing and has significant national interests for the U.S. North Korea's unprovoked attacks on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island last year and its nuclear programs show the ongoing security challenge posed by events in Northeast Asia and the threat North Korea remains to regional peace and stability. By maintaining a U.S. military force presence in the ROK, a stabilizing presence is maintained that allows for the implementation of strategies to de-escalate crises should they occur and thus promote peace and stability on the Korean

Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. Forward-stationed U.S. military forces in the ROK also create opportunities for enhanced American engagement with a key alliance partner as well as with other states and key actors throughout the region.

My three command priorities of being prepared to fight and win, strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and improving the quality of life for Command personnel are enduring and serve as guiding principles for all key initiatives pursued. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan – as a comprehensive plan for evolution of the military component of the U.S.-ROK Alliance – synchronizes American and Korean transformation efforts designed to build adaptive and flexible force capabilities to deter provocations and aggression against the ROK and to defeat aggression should it occur. The repositioning of U.S. forces in the ROK improves force readiness and soldier quality of life, realizes stationing efficiencies, signals continued American commitment to defense of the ROK and engagement with the broader region, and enhances force protection and survivability. Tour normalization keeps trained and ready military personnel in place for longer periods of time, improving combat capability, lowering turbulence in the organizational environment, and reducing the stress placed on troops, units, and families.

I am extremely proud of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, DoD Civilians, and their families serving our great nation in the ROK. Their selfless service promotes peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as well as in the broader region of Northeast Asia. Your support for them and the U.S.-ROK Alliance is greatly appreciated. I am certain you will agree that our men and women in uniform deserve the very best working, living, and training environment that can be provided, and that we should do everything in our power to provide it. Thank you.