Calvert Remarks at Oversight Hearing for the United States Navy and Marine Corps
Mr. Secretary, congratulations on your appointment. We’ve already had several productive engagements, and I look forward to continuing to work with you. Admiral Kilby, General Smith, thank you for joining us today. We greatly appreciate your service. Today, we meet at a time of increasing global instability. The Navy and Marine Corps are under extraordinary operational demand, responding to threats across every domain.
For the past 19 months, naval forces have engaged in daily combat operations in the Red Sea to protect international shipping from Iranian-backed Houthi attacks. These actions underscore the critical role our fleet plays in maintaining freedom of navigation and the security of global commerce. At the same time, we face a rising near-peer challenge in the Indo-Pacific. China continues to build the world’s largest navy- surpassing the U.S. Navy in both ship count and shipbuilding capacity. China is on pace to surpass the U.S. Navy in firepower in the coming years. Already today, the Chinese far outnumber us in hypersonic weapons.
In any potential conflict with China, the Navy will be the linchpin of our ability to project power across the vast Indo-Pacific region. The sheer scale of that theater demands a capable and ready fleet—and I remain deeply concerned that we are not building or sustaining our naval forces at the pace required to meet that challenge. Years of delays, cost overruns, and workforce challenges have slowed production across critical shipbuilding programs, including Virginia and Columbia-class submarines, Ford-class aircraft carriers, and Constellation-class frigates. At the same time, the demand for capable, survivable platforms is only increasing.
Delays in construction of the lead Columbia-class submarine presents a significant risk to strategic deterrence. I understand that the delivery schedule continues to slip since the 45-day shipbuilding review that was completed last spring, and the Columbia program is now looking at an 18–24-month delay in delivering the lead ship. How does this happen to the Navy’s priority program? Further, I fear that delays in the Virginia-class program will only be compounded by delays in Columbia-class submarine construction. The Virginia-class program continues to hover at a construction cadence of 1.2 submarines a year versus the necessary cadence of two per year. Congress has invested significantly in the submarine industrial base. I want to know when these investments will prove out. While my optimism is waning, I’m hopeful that the recent award of funding for wage and productivity enhancements at the prime shipyards will help turn the tide.
Ship maintenance and repair is another significant problem. Too many ships are stuck in yards too long, impacting readiness and deployment schedules. The Navy continues to face serious challenges in sustaining fleet readiness due to persistent maintenance delays across both public and private shipyards. A shortage of skilled labor, aging infrastructure, and inconsistent planning are undermining our ability to execute timely maintenance availabilities. This problem carries operational consequences that are immediate and strategic. Delays ripple through deployment schedules, degrade crew morale, and strain already overtasked platforms. These readiness shortfalls directly impact the Navy and Marine Corps’ ability to respond to global crises and surge forces where needed. Without decisive improvements in maintenance execution, we risk building a fleet on paper that cannot meet operational demands in practice.
This brings me to the Navy’s requirement around amphibious warfare ships. While the Navy is required to maintain a fleet of at least 31 amphibs, the current state of the fleet raises serious doubts about whether that requirement is being met in an operationally credible way. Aging hulls, maintenance delays, and a lack of sustained investment have eroded the operational availability of our amphibious fleet—putting real pressure on the Marine Corps’ ability to train, deploy, and respond globally. Amphibious ships are not optional assets; they are central to our ability to project power, reassure allies, and deter adversaries. This Committee expects a plan not just to meet the letter of the law, but to ensure the amphibious fleet is truly capable and ready.
We must get shipbuilding back on track and strengthen the industrial base that supports it. That includes looking to expand international cooperation—particularly with close partners like Japan and South Korea, who are developing advanced naval technologies and regional shipbuilding expertise that may present collaborative opportunities. We need creative solutions to increase throughput, expand capacity, and leverage private sector partnerships where possible. Now, I’ve questioned the Navy’s future investment in aircraft carriers, and I think we’ve seen a valuable discussion as a result. We shouldn’t be afraid to have these debates. But I want to be clear today, the aircraft carrier serves a critical role in power projection and will most certainly continue to provide the joint force with extraordinary strike warfare and unrivaled air superiority as we enter the Davidson window and beyond.
That said, we cannot effectively operate carriers without aircraft. I am alarmed by the downward trend in the Navy’s procurement in strike fighter aircraft over the last several years. Today, the Navy faces a growing shortfall in strike fighter aircraft as our carriers sustain a grueling and intense operating tempo in the Red Sea and around the globe. Admiral Paparo, the Indo-Pacific Commander, recently testified that China is out-producing the U.S. in advanced fighters and is now positioned—for the first time—to surpass the U.S. in air superiority in the Pacific. I will not parse my words here. We need sixth generation fighters. The U.S. Navy needs sixth generation fighters. I am concerned that any hesitancy on our part to proceed with the planned procurement of sixth generation fighters for the Navy will leave us dangerously outmatched in a China fight. We cannot wait.
Further, we cannot expect to grow the defense industrial base by undermining it. Aviation programs that rely on highly specialized supply chains and skilled labor cannot be turned on and off like a switch. If we continue sending mixed signals—through delayed buys, program instability, or shifting requirements—we risk hollowing out the very industrial base we need for future readiness. We must treat this sector as a strategic asset—not as an afterthought. Over the past year, the Navy has operated under intense and sustained combat conditions in the Red Sea—the most active maritime conflict zone in a generation. Daily missile and drone engagements against Iranian-backed Houthi forces have turned theoretical warfighting concepts into real-life execution under fire. These operations are yielding invaluable insights into missile defense, unmanned system integration, and command and control in a high-threat environment.
But this persistent operational tempo comes at a cost. Ships and crews are being pushed hard, deployments are being extended, and readiness for other global contingencies is being strained. The Navy must balance the urgency of today’s fight with the imperative to reset, repair, and prepare for tomorrow’s challenges. We look forward to hearing how this experience is informing tactical development, force posture, and long-term fleet health. The conflict in Ukraine continues to demonstrate how low-cost, autonomous systems—especially drones—can deliver outsized battlefield effects against far more expensive platforms. These conflicts are reshaping our understanding of warfare, where speed, scale, and adaptability often outweigh traditional measures of strength.
Our ability to capitalize on these emerging technologies will depend on how effectively we partner with the private sector. Many of the tools we need—artificial intelligence, autonomy, and edge computing—are being developed outside the traditional defense ecosystem. To keep pace with a rapidly evolving threat environment, the Navy must do more than experiment; it must reduce barriers to entry for commercial innovators and field successful concepts quickly and at scale. I look forward to continue to partner with you on supporting and promoting innovation. Over the last several years the Marine Corps has undergone a significant transformation. This shift to a lighter, more agile, and distributed force capable of operating inside contested maritime spaces is both bold and necessary.
As the Marine Corps pursues new capabilities to support Force Design, it is essential that its acquisition programs are grounded in rigorous analysis and supported by fulsome, validated requirements to ensure systems are relevant, sustainable, and delivered on time. The future of the Marine Corps depends on getting this right, and we are committed to providing the resources—and the oversight—to make that happen.
