Diaz-Balart Remarks at FY25 Budget Request for the U.S. International Development Finance Corporations (As Prepared)

The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs will come to order.

CEO Nathan, welcome to the Subcommittee.

I also want to give a warm welcome to Congressman Chuck Edwards, our newest Member of the Subcommittee. I know he will make an outstanding contribution to our efforts and I look forward to working together in the weeks and months ahead.

Today’s hearing is on the Fiscal Year 2025 request for the United States International Development Finance Corporation.

Congress supported the launch of DFC, the official development finance institution of the United States, in 2019 to better mobilize private capital to support high-quality economic growth in low- and middle-income countries and to advance United States foreign policy and national security priorities.

A key reason for Congress to pass the BUILD Act and create the DFC was to provide a competitive alternate to predatory lending by the People’s Republic of China and other authoritarian governments seeking to buy influence, or worse, pressure poorer countries to succumb to their policy priorities as a result of the crushing debt owed to these malign states.

DFC’s initial seven-year authorization will expire in September 2025, and I’m sure we’ll touch on some of your reauthorization issues during our discussion today.

DFC currently has a $60 billion lending cap, and its development portfolio has reached more than $40 billion across more than 100 countries.

CEO Nathan, your FY25 request is nearly $1.01 billion, a $25 million or 2.4% increase over the prior year. Of that amount, $763 million is requested for program expenses and $245 million for administrative costs.

Most of the proposed increase would support administrative costs, including an expansion of DFC’s overseas presence and the growth of its domestic workforce.

As you know, to date, the DFC has largely enjoyed bipartisan support on Capitol Hill and in this Committee.

For example, I want to highlight DFC’s partnerships with its sister institutions in Taiwan, Japan, Australia, and Korea to advance shared development priorities in the Indo-Pacific—such as in the Philippines—as well as here in the Western Hemisphere.

DFC has also played an increasingly important role in supporting partners bearing the economic consequences of Russian aggression.

These examples represent a clear tie to advancing U.S. national interests and countering the influence of our adversaries.

Some of us, however, are increasingly concerned that the White House’s controversial policy blinders on issues like climate change are hobbling DFC’s ability to advance economic development and counter Russia and China in critical markets and regions around the world. I also am concerned that going too far down the Biden Administration’s “woke” agenda jeopardizes this agency’s widespread bipartisan support.

DFC is not alone in being pushed into misguided, counterproductive, and even harmful policies of the Biden Administration.

The Department of Treasury’s restrictions on common-sense investments, which are based on climate change virtue signaling, simply do not fit here. But even worse, these restrictions throw the door wide open for Communist China and are completely self-defeating from an economic and national security perspective.

Another concern I want to raise is DFC country eligibility standards, which likely result in missed opportunities to help nearshore critical supply chains, counter China, and advance our economic and national interests in Latin America.

I hope during our hearing today that you can address these concerns and other issues that will play a key role in determining not only the funding for this fiscal year, but the future of the DFC in U.S. foreign policy.

In closing, let me note that we appreciate your service and that of the men and women who serve with you in this important agency.

I now yield to Ranking Member Lee for her opening remarks.